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Avian Influenza
H5N1 and
Healthcare
Workers
To the Editor: Since January
2004, 35 human cases of avian
influenza A virus H5N1 have been
reported in Vietnam. Human-to-
human transmission of H5N1 is a
major concern, particularly because of
reported family clustering (1). Two
probable cases of human-to-human
transmission were recently reported
from Thailand (2), and evidence for
human-to-human transmission was
found in the 1997 Hong Kong out-
break (3). We evaluated healthcare
workers exposed to 2 patients
(patients 5 and 6 [1], referred to as
patients A and B, respectively, in this
article) with H5N1 infection, con-
firmed by polymerase chain reaction
(PCR), to determine the potential risk
for nosocomial human-to-human
transmission of H5N1.
Patient A was admitted to a gener-
al ward of a pediatric hospital in Ho
Chi Minh City on January 15, 2004,
on day 8 of illness; no infection con-
trol measures were taken at that time.
On January 18, 2004, she was trans-
ferred to the intensive care unit (ICU).
Eight hours after ICU admission, lim-
ited infection control measures were
implemented: the patient was trans-
ferred to a single room, and healthcare
workers were required to use dispos-
able surgical masks and gloves and
wear nondisposable gowns. However,
because resources were limited, each
healthcare worker wore only 1 glove.
On January 23, patient A was trans-
ferred to another hospital.
Patient B was admitted to the
infectious diseases ward of the pedi-
atric hospital on January 19, 2004, on
day 6 of illness; he was transferred to
the ICU after 4 hours and stayed there
until he died on January 23. Infection
control measures were implemented 2
days after ICU admission; these
measures were similar to those taken
for patient A except that no single
room was available.
From January 25 to 27, 2004, a
nasal swab specimen and baseline
serum sample were collected from
healthcare workers at the hospital;
each worker also completed a ques-
tionnaire. On February 9 and 10, fol-
low-up serum samples were collected.
Nasal swab samples were tested by
reverse transcription (RT)-PCR to
detect the H5 gene (1). Paired serum
samples were subjected to enzyme-
linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA)
(Virion/Serion, Würzburg, Germany)
to detect immunoglobulin G against
the nucleoprotein of influenza A;
samples were also subjected to an H5-
specific microneutralization assay (4).
Of 62 healthcare workers involved
in caring for patient A, patient B, or
both, 60 (97%) provided both samples
and questionnaires: 16 who cared for
patient Aon the general ward, 33 who
cared for patients A and B in the ICU,
and 11 who cared for patient B on the
infectious diseases ward or who were
consulted for diagnostic or clinical
procedures involving either patient.
Characteristics of the workers and
their exposures are shown in the
Table.
The median time between last
exposure and collection of the nasal
swab and the baseline serum samples
was 7 days (range 2–12 days). The
median time between last exposure
and collection of the follow-up serum
sample was 21 days (range 17–26
days). All 60 nasal swab samples were
negative by RT-PCR. Paired serum
samples were available from 46LETTERS
healthcare workers, and 42 were nega-
tive in the influenza A–specific
ELISA, 2 reacted with a negative-to-
borderline response, 1 had a border-
line-to-positive response, and 1 had 2
positive responses. A positive
response indicates recent infection. All
paired serum samples, 12 additional
baseline samples, and 2 additional fol-
low-up samples were negative in the
H5-specific microneutralization assay.
None of the paired samples from 4
healthcare workers that were reactive
in the ELISAshowed 4-fold or greater
changes in titer in H1- and H3-specif-
ic hemagglutination inhibition and
microneutralization assays, which
indicates they had not recently been
infected with human influenza. None
of these 4 healthcare workers reported
any illness or potential exposure to
H5N1 other than to patient Aor B. The
ELISA results were considered non-
specific. Paired serum samples from
patient Ashowed clear seroconversion
in both ELISA and H5 microneutral-
ization. Serum specimens were not
available from patient B.
We found no transmission of
H5N1 to healthcare workers, despite
the lack of infection control measures,
which suggests inefficient human-to-
human H5N1 transmission; similar
results were found in Hanoi (5).
Droplet and contact transmission are
considered the most effective means
of transmitting influenza A in hospi-
tals, and the clinical importance of
airborne transmission has not been
fully elucidated (6). Diarrhea in
H5N1-infected patients potentially
contains viable virus (1,7) and may
affect the H5N1 transmission route.
While these results appear reassuring,
the limited options that were available
to prevent nosocomial infection are
worrisome. If reassortment between
avian and human influenza A virus
were to occur, resulting in a virus with
pandemic potential, nosocomial trans-
mission would be a concern. Infection
control measures are crucial in all
cases of avian influenza, and
resources to prevent nosocomial
infection must be made available in
affected countries.
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